讲座时间：2025年7月31日（周四）下午15：00-17：00

讲座地点：#腾讯会议：382-329-184

讲座主题：Disability-Inclusive Workforce Planning

主讲嘉宾：肖勇波

讲座内容：

Hiring persons with disabilities (PWDs) is widely recognized as an essential component of corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, such employment often entails challenges in lower service level or increased training costs due to the generally limited educational attainment of PWDs. This paper studies the hiring and training decisions for a socially responsible firm and examines how these decisions are shaped by government intervention policies. Specifically, we consider a setting in which customers are socially conscious, and demand depends on both service level and the firm's PWD employment. The firm decides on the proportion of PWDs to hire and whether to provide them with training (if hired), aiming to maximize a weighted objective that balances its utility and the welfare of PWDs. As expected, we show that the firm hires PWDs only when customers' prosocial level exceeds a threshold, and increases the hiring proportion as prosociality rises. In terms of training, however, it may withhold training when prosociality is sufficiently high. Furthermore, we examine the impacts of two types of government subsidies, i.e., subsidy granted per PWD trained (training subsidy) and granted per PWD hired (employment subsidy). Surprisingly, we show that the two types of subsidies can sometimes backfire. That is, a low training subsidy encourages investment in training but may motivate the firm to hire a lower proportion of PWDs, especially when both customers' prosocial level and the training cost are moderately high, in which cases training all hired PWDs would be costly, but not so significant as to discourage training completely. With a low employment subsidy, the firm can secure the subsidy simply by hiring more PWDs; therefore, it may find it more profitable to withhold training altogether when both customers' prosocial level and the training cost are moderately low. We further reveal that these unintended outcomes of government subsidies, based on training or employment, can ultimately undermine the we

嘉宾简介：

肖勇波，清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程系长聘正教授，教育部长江学者青年学者（2016年）、国家杰青（2021年）和优青（2012年）。于2000年获得清华大学管理信息系学士学位，2005年获得清华大学管理科学与工程管理学硕士学位和博士学位，2008年在清华大学经济管理学院应用经济系完成博士后研究，2008年8月加入经管学院管理科学与工程系。曾荣获中国管理学青年奖（2014年）、北京市科学技术奖（2005年）等。担任国际学术期刊“Naval Research Logistics”的Associate Editor，“Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering”的Managing Editor。

主要研究领域为收益和定价管理、服务系统和服务管理、供应链管理。讲授课程包括服务管理、DMD（数据、模型与决策）、运筹学。曾荣获北京市科技进步三等奖（2005年）。

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